A prison PPP is the opposite of a toll asset: there is no demand risk, the state pays a contracted, inflation-linked unitary charge for every place, whether or not the cell is full. The catch is performance: when a cell is unavailable or a service standard is missed, the contract docks the payment with weighted deductions. Because the operator's cost base (custodial staffing, FM) is sticky, those deductions fall almost entirely through to EBITDA. The case turns on the size of the estate, the unitary charge, and how reliably it is delivered.
Year-1 financials flow live from the simulation above: revenue £0 and EBITDA £0 p.a. As you set your deal terms below, the unlevered IRR (asset return) and levered IRR (return to equity, after debt) recompute instantly.
Illustrative model. Represents an availability-based prison PPP/PFI concession. Gross revenue = places × unitary charge, split into an availability (accommodation) payment and a custodial-services payment; net revenue deducts weighted availability/performance deductions of roughly 1.4× the pro-rata value of unavailable capacity. Operating costs (custodial staffing, facilities management, healthcare & programmes, insurance, lifecycle & SPV costs) are dominated by per-place staffing and are largely fixed against availability, so deductions fall almost entirely through to EBITDA. EBITDA = net revenue − operating costs; excludes upfront construction capex and senior debt service. The investment case is a simplified DCF. For illustration only, not investment advice, and not any specific asset.